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The law has always recognized children’s special needs for protection. 
Children are vulnerable also in relation to the processing of their data, 
since they are less aware of risks emerging from data processing. The new 
General Data Protection Regulation (General Data Protection Regulation 
2016 (EU), GDPR) has strengthened children’s safety. Higher transparency 
standards are now required. Any information offered should be in a clear 
language that the child can easily understand. The right to be forgotten 
is reinforced when a child has given her consent to data processing, but 
later wishes to withdraw this consent. Children’s rights and freedoms 
may override the interests of the controller and could render processing 
unlawful. Minors below the age of 16 can consent only via a parent. This 
chapter focuses on challenges posed by the new GDPR (General Data 
Protection Regulation 2016 (EU)) and on potential benefits for children’s 
rights to data protection.  
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1. Introduction
Children enjoy a fundamental right to freedom of expression (United Na-
tions Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UN), Article 13) and a 
right to education (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1989 (UN), Articles 28, 29) as well as a right to development (United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UN), Article 6) and 
a right to privacy (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
1989 (UN), Article 16), rights protected constitutionally in most European, 
and other, countries. As firms and organizations process a huge volume 
of children’s personal data, whose lives have become increasingly data-
fied (Lupton & Williamson, 2017, p. 781), the interplay and the balancing 
of these rights has become increasingly strenuous in the current digital 
world. 
Children may benefit from all digital services offered to enhance their 
creativity, participation, interaction, or self-expression, but they are also 
threatened by “digital risks” emerging from (to name but a few) cyber-bul-
lying, targeted advertisements or hateful speech (Palfrey, Sacco, & Boyd, 
2008, p. 17). Parents tend to, covertly or overtly, monitor children’s  
behavior (Livingstone & Helsper, 2008, p. 589) or control on their on-
line activities. Innovative technologies allow and encourage parents to 
engage in such monitoring (Family Online Safety Institute, 2011, p. 3-4; 
Kirwil, 2009). 
Existing tools empower parents to set limits with regard to time spent 
online, content visited, or services offered (Family Online Safety Institute, 
2011). Mobile apps, promising “continuous connectivity”, are designed for 
parents to track whereabouts of their children. The so-called “Quanti-
fied Self”, i.e. any individual engaged in self-tracking of any kind of bio-
logical, physical, behavioral, or environmental information (Swan, 2013, 
p. 85-86), renders bodies transparent and calculable: via an application 
human behavior, e.g. sleeping patterns or how many steps one walked, 
may be measured, managed, and monitored even more deeply. However, 
data distribution on the Internet allows remote-tracking of others’ data, 
which leads to a “Quantified Otherness”, in which others are approached 
through data (Gabriels, 2016, p. 176). Smart applications, such as 1TopSpy 
(FAQs – 1TopSpy Cell Phone Spy App, 2014), secretly record SMS 
messages, Call history, Contact list, Web visited history, or Applications 
usage history, and track GPS location of the phone in real time. The tar-
get-phone holder is unaware that the application is installed and, as no 
response or participation is required, parents may control children with-
out any interaction. 
Since technological developments refl ct what society values, such appli-
cations can be regarded as leading examples of the contemporary desire 
for “truth-making machines” (Gregg, 2013, p. 307). Many “tracking-tools”, 
like Life360 (https://www.life360.com/), are offered free of charge. The 
endless capabilities of digital technology monitoring raise the question 
of how to better protect children’s rights in relation to their data.
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2. The GDPR and children’s data processing
The Data Protection Directive (DPD, Directive on the protection of indi-
viduals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data 1995 (EU)) did not mention the word “children” 
and, hence, treated both adults and children equally. However, as children 
became avid users of technologies (Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party, 2013, p. 26), attention was drawn to strengthening their right to 
personal data protection (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2009, 
p. 2). After having recognized minors’ vulnerability (Article 29 Data Pro-
tection Working Party, 2010, p. 17), decision-makers accepted that chil-
dren are less aware of risks and they, hence, merit specifi  protection that 
should, in particular, apply to use of data for the purposes of marketing or 
creating profiles (General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU), Recital 
38). So, higher transparency standards are required and, for instance, any 
information should be in plain language that children can easily under-
stand (General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU), Recital 58, Article 
12(1)). 
A child is every human being below the age of eighteen years, unless she 
has acquired legal adulthood before that age (Article 29 Data Protec-
tion Working Party, 2009, p. 3; United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 1989 (UN), Article 1). But defining a child so broadly could 
negatively impact older children’s rights and, in particular, their ability to 
access the Internet and express themselves freely (Montgomery & Ches-
ter, 2015, p. 289). Indeed, children are in a special situation that could be 
seen from a static and a dynamic perspective (Article 29 Data Protection 
Working Party, 2009, p. 3): they are persons who have not yet achieved 
physical and psychological maturity (static point of view), and they are 
in the process of developing physically and mentally to become adults 
(dynamic point of view) (Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, 2009, 
p. 3). Under the GDPR, the European legislator took such concerns into 
account and made clear that when “information society’s services” are 
offered “directly” to a child, personal data processing is lawful when the 
child is at least sixteen years old –and has given consent– while, where 
the child is below that age, consent must be given by the holder of paren-
tal responsibility (General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU), Article 
8(1)). An “information society’s service” is defined as any service normal-
ly provided for remuneration, at a distance, by electronic means, and at 
the individual request of a recipient of services (General Data Protection 
Regulation 2016 (EU), Article 4(25); Directive laying down a procedure 
for the provision of information in the field of technical regulations and 
of rules on Information Society services 2015 (EU), Article 1(1)(b)).
As payment is a condition in this case, one could question whether ad-
vertising services, services provided by non-profit e.g. educational)  
organizations, or in general all “free digital services” (e-mail services etc) 
are included in the list. Moreover, these “information society’s services” 
are required to be offered “directly” to a child, but it is not very clear 
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whether these refer to services that are targeted to children (like Face-
book’s “messenger kids”: https://messengerkids.com/) or to those that are 
offered on a daily basis (such as the very Facebook itself). Further uncer-
tainties concerning harmonization could emerge, as Member States may 
provide by law for a lower age, provided that it is not below thirteen years 
(General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU), Article 8(1)). Hence, dif-
ferent age thresholds can be set by national laws. Given the complexities 
of the digital environment, which question parents’ capacity to make bet-
ter decisions than their children (Hof, 2016, p. 434), a high age threshold 
could pose risks, putting too much responsibility in the hands of those 
who are not always familiar with technologies. There are no exceptions 
with regard to parents’ consent (unless children’s data is processed in the 
context of preventive or counseling services offered directly to the child; 
General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU), Recital 38), which could 
lead to excessive parental interference or even breach of children’s right 
to privacy (Hof, 2016, p. 440) and to development: to provide informed 
consent, a parent should become aware of the child’s online activities; to 
become aware, parents would need to monitor and track minors. 
While it is recognized that the right to erasure is crucial, in cases where 
a child has given her consent, but later –when no longer a child–  
wishes to waive this consent and remove her data (General Data Protec-
tion Regulation 2016 (EU), Recital 65), however, the provision (General 
Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU), Article 17) that reinforces the right 
to erasure makes no reference to children. So, exercising this right may 
not always be straightforward in practice (Blume, 2015, p. 262).
Although decisions based solely on automated processing should not 
concern a child (General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU),Recital 
71), the “profiling article” (General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU), 
Article 22) mentions nothing in relation to the specifi  protection that 
children merit.  Additionally, even though the above children’s rights and 
freedoms may override interests pursued by the controller and could, 
thus, render this processing unlawful (General Data Protection Regula-
tion 2016 (EU), Article 6(1)(f)), how data controllers will undertake 
balancing tests in practice remains uncertain.   
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3. Parents’ monitoring vs. minors’ rights  
Raising children with access to the Internet is a –relatively– new phe-
nomenon. One could argue that children, who are not yet “in the maturity 
of their faculties” (Mill, 1859, 2001, p. 54), could or should be treated 
paternalistically. To some, parents are the most important guardians of 
children’s welfare, as they are deeply concerned about the impact that 
technologies may have on minors (Kaiser Foundation, 2004, p. 12; Living-
stone & Bober, 2006, p. 93). They would ensure that their children would 
“jump” into a swimming-pool only after having learnt how to swim (By-
ron, 2008, p. 107). Similarly, they would ensure that their children would 
not be harmed in the digital world.
Parental control is, to a large extent, necessary to direct children to 
adulthood. Some have described this parents-children relation as the 
“archetype of responsibility” (Jonas, 1984, p. 130). Children, when poorly 
monitored, may be more likely to express antisocial or criminal behavior 
(Stattin & Kerr, 2000, p. 1072) and parents’ involvement could establish 
the rules necessary to facilitate communication (Stattin & Kerr, 2000, p. 
1082). However, the active role and the participation of minors them-
selves should also be clearly acknowledged. 
Early adolescence can be understood as a stage, in which teenagers strive 
for autonomy and self-determination, as a transition period to prepare 
for separation from parents, to become self-reliant. In this phase, minors 
tend to avoid parental control (Barron, 2014, p. 408) and they want the 
right to be ignored by those whom they see as being “in their business” 
(Boyd, 2014, p. 55). So, early teens not only disobey –to negotiate or al-
ter– parents’ rules (Fleming, 2005, p. 13) but also make decisions  
autonomously. 
Autonomy, in the context of informational privacy, requires that  
individuals are “rational project pursuers” (Moore, 2003, p. 215) and 
choosers (Benn, 1980, p. 60) who steer their course through the world. 
To be a person, an individual must recognize not just her actual capacity 
but also her exclusive moral right to shape her destiny by her choices 
(Reiman, 1976, p. 39).
Although it could be claimed that teens lack this moral autonomy, which 
mainly refers to adults (Scarre, 1980, p. 123), albeit, children do not turn 
miraculously into grown up persons. They, thus, need to enjoy certain 
rights depending on the level of their maturity and the capacity to in-
dependently make reasoned choices. As emerging persons, they need 
to have the right to develop, to turn into autonomous agents. To do so, 
they need privacy; the ability to see themselves as autonomous, to learn 
that they are capable of controlling when and by whom the thoughts in 
their head will be experienced by someone other than themselves, and 
to learn that they are entitled to such control and that they will not be 
forced to reveal the contents of their consciousness even if they put such 
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contents on “paper” (Reiman, 1976, p. 43). 
Intimacy is crucial in this context. To be friends or lovers, persons need 
to be intimate to some degree with each other. There is a need to share 
information about one’s actions, beliefs or emotions that one does not 
share with everybody and that one has the right not to share with any-
one; by granting this right, privacy creates “moral capital” that is “spent” 
in friendship and love (Gerstein, 1970, p. 89).   
In the children-parents relation, the above means that the child should 
enjoy privacy to exercise the right to development and become intimate 
with her parents and with others. If a minor were completely disallowed 
to keep her own secrets or share secrets with those she would wish, she 
would not be able to create relationships or learn how friendship work 
and would not be able to develop. 
4. A children-friendly interpretation of the GDPR   
 
The GDPR’s parental consent prerequisite supports a “paternalistic argu-
ment”: Parents must protect children from harm as minors face risks on-
line. Information about their online behavior is needed to protect them 
and, so, monitoring is good to get this information and necessary to give 
informed consent. Therefore, parents should monitor online activity.
Monitoring, however, as a paternalistic action, intends to remove or 
restrict the choice of a person (Clarke, 2002, p. 82). When it comes to 
children’s privacy, it would be fair to argue that such practices should not 
always be acceptable. 
Digital risks are in some cases overstated, while monitoring can be in-
effective, as one cannot infer someone’s beliefs from mere information. 
Namely, a minor may read a racist text but this does not always mean 
that she shares the author’s views. Moreover, monitoring may harm in 
other cases, such as where unreasonably conservative parents would 
completely restrict their minor’s freedom, if they found that he was gay. 
Besides, covert monitoring, if discovered, could undermine trust, while 
overt monitoring would be a clear message that the parents do not trust 
their child. 
There is, it follows, a need for reciprocity, mutual respect and trust that 
would encourage minors to become media educated, instead of app 
monitored. Perhaps, parents and children should engage in democratic 
negotiations, share online activities, and talk more about the Internet. 
And, in our view, the GDPR does offer the provisions necessary to ren-
der minors beneficiaries of the data-driven reality. The principle of data 
protection by design and by default (General Data Protection Regulation 
2016 (EU), Article 25) could oblige firms to introduce different default 
settings for children. Since firms should evaluate the risks inherent in 
data processing and implement measures to mitigate them (General Data 
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Protection Regulation 2016 (EU), Recital 83), a data protection impact as-
sessment could be conducted (General Data Protection Regulation 2016 
(EU), Article 35) when minors’ data is processed. While children’s data is 
not included in Recital 91 of the GDPR, however, it could be argued that, 
in light of Recital 38, carrying out the above assessment would be a good 
practice. Furthermore, supervisory authorities could very well perform 
their role as promoters of public awareness (General Data Protection 
Regulation 2016 (EU), Article 57) and, hence, encourage digital media 
literacy. Codes of Conduct (General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU), 
Article 40(2)(g)) could also be introduced to efficientl  and effectively 
provide information and make clear how to “formulate” plain language 
(General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU), Article 12(1)). 
Lawyers, data scientists, software designers, ethicists and others should 
all work together to make information understandable. This way, moni-
toring would very likely be mostly avoided, the use of tracking-applica-
tions would most probably be limited for exceptional situations (to serve 
goals of benevolence), and parents, when wondering whether their child 
is threatened by the e-world, would ask themselves questions asked in 
the emergence of an alleged “offline threat”: “Does she study less? Did 
she quit her friends and activities? Has she become antisocial?” If the 
answer is “no”, monitoring is probably unreasonable. 
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